reportHinnangud ja arvustused pole kinnitatud. Lisateave
Teave selle e-raamatu kohta
Rollover risk imposes market discipline on banks’ risk-taking behavior but it can be socially costly. I present a two-sided model in which a bank simultaneously lends to a firm and borrows from the short-term funding market. When the bank is capital constrained, uncertainty in asset quality and rollover risk create a negative externality that spills over to the real economy by ex ante credit contraction. Macroprudential and monetary policies can be used to reduce the social cost of market discipline and improve efficiency.
Google Playst ostetud audioraamatuid saab kuulata arvuti veebibrauseris.
E-lugerid ja muud seadmed
E-tindi seadmetes (nt Kobo e-lugerid) lugemiseks peate faili alla laadima ja selle oma seadmesse üle kandma. Failide toetatud e-lugeritesse teisaldamiseks järgige üksikasjalikke abikeskuse juhiseid.