Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model
Οκτ 2011 · Princeton University Press
ebook
296
Σελίδες
family_home
Κατάλληλο
info
reportΟι αξιολογήσεις και οι κριτικές δεν επαληθεύονται Μάθετε περισσότερα
Σχετικά με το ebook
Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. Here Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti offer the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. Laver and Sergenti model party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where today's political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterday's political outcomes.
Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic "valence" advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.
Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic "valence" advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.
Σχετικά με τον συγγραφέα
Michael Laver is professor of politics at New York University. He is the coauthor of Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Ernest Sergenti is a consultant at the World Bank.
Αξιολογήστε αυτό το ebook
Πείτε μας τη γνώμη σας.
Πληροφορίες ανάγνωσης
Smartphone και tablet
Εγκαταστήστε την εφαρμογή Βιβλία Google Play για Android και iPad/iPhone. Συγχρονίζεται αυτόματα με τον λογαριασμό σας και σας επιτρέπει να διαβάζετε στο διαδίκτυο ή εκτός σύνδεσης, όπου κι αν βρίσκεστε.
Φορητοί και επιτραπέζιοι υπολογιστές
Μπορείτε να ακούσετε ηχητικά βιβλία τα οποία αγοράσατε στο Google Play, χρησιμοποιώντας το πρόγραμμα περιήγησης στον ιστό του υπολογιστή σας.
eReader και άλλες συσκευές
Για να διαβάσετε περιεχόμενο σε συσκευές e-ink, όπως είναι οι συσκευές Kobo eReader, θα χρειαστεί να κατεβάσετε ένα αρχείο και να το μεταφέρετε στη συσκευή σας. Ακολουθήστε τις αναλυτικές οδηγίες του Κέντρου βοήθειας για να μεταφέρετε αρχεία σε υποστηριζόμενα eReader.
