Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking
Π½ΠΎΡΠ±. 2015β―Π³. Β· International Monetary Fund
ΠΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π°
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ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ
reportΠΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ·ΡΠ²Ρ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½Ρ. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠΎΠ±Π½Π΅Π΅β¦
ΠΠ± ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π΅
Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky βside activitiesβ(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.
ΠΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Ρ
ΠΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡ Ρ Π½Π°ΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΈΠΌ ΠΌΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ.
ΠΠ΄Π΅ ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ
Π‘ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΡΠΎΠ½Ρ ΠΈ ΠΏΠ»Π°Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΡ
Π£ΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Google Play ΠΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Android ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ iPad/iPhone. ΠΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ
ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Ρ Π²Π°ΡΠΈΠΌ Π°ΠΊΠΊΠ°ΡΠ½ΡΠΎΠΌ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ, ΠΈ Π²Ρ ΡΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ Π»ΡΠ±ΠΈΠΌΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ»Π°ΠΉΠ½ Π³Π΄Π΅ ΡΠ³ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎ.
ΠΠΎΡΡΠ±ΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡ
Π‘Π»ΡΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠ΅ Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΈΠΎΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ ΠΈΠ· Google Play Π² Π²Π΅Π±-Π±ΡΠ°ΡΠ·Π΅ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅.
Π£ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³
Π§ΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Ρ Π½Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π΅ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Kobo, ΡΠΊΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΉΠ» ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΠ±Π°Π²ΡΡΠ΅ Π΅Π³ΠΎ Π½Π° ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΎ. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ Π½Π°ΠΉΡΠΈ Π² Π‘ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ΅.
